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NoTEs AND Co ErN s
nized that the Federal courts have moved in the opposite direction).
A may not raise an objection to the venue of the claims asserted by
B against C.
4. When A asserts several claims against C arising out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter of A's claim against
B, or vice versa, the claims must independently satisfy the venue
statutes.
5. When A sues B and C, and B serves several cross-claims against C
which arise out of the transaction or occurrence which is the sub-
ject matter of A's claim, the cross-claims are ancillary to A's claim,
and the statutory venue of the cross-claims need not be met.
J. ARNA GREGoRY, Jn.
FUTURE INTERESTS-ALIENABILITY OF A POSSIBILITY OF
REVERTER IN KENTUCKY
In the recent case of Austin v. Calvert,1 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals held that a possibility of reverter may be conveyed in this
state. The opinion lacks clarity both in reasoning and terminology, how-
ever, and the purpose of this note is to constructively criticize the
case with the hope that a clearer understanding of the problem will
be gained.
In 1918, Austin conveyed an acre of land to a school board by a
deed which provided: ". . . and said land reverts to the donor when it
ceases to be used for a school house." In 1921, the Calverts acquired
by deed from Austin the fee simple absolute title to a 29 acre tract
which included the school house area. In 1931, the school board aban-
doned the one acre plot and the Calverts claimed fee simple owner-
ship of it. Austin's heirs claimed that his 1918 deed to the school
board created a possibility of reverter in him because the school board
took a determinable fee, and that his future interest did not pass to
the Calverts in his 1921 deed because it was a mere contingency and
could not be aliened or sold. The Court of Appeals decided correctly
that the interest was alienable, but failed to decide what kind of
interest it was, and held that it could be conveyed regardless of
whether it was a possibility of reverter, a reversion, or a "possibility
of reversion." Although this conclusion is sound as a general proposi-
tion, it may lead to considerable confusion in future cases because the
court based its decision on certain statutes which it considered con-
1262 S.W. 2d 825 (Ky. 1953).
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trolling, but which may not be controlling at all unless the kind of
future interest is properly designated. In addition, the Court of Ap-
peals has said by dictum prior to this case that a possibility of reverter
is not alienable for the very reason urged by the Austins.2
Before proceeding to an analysis of statutes in question, as cited
and construed by the court, it may be helpful to point out that the
future interest involved in this case clearly satisfies the generally
accepted definition of a possibility of reverter. A possibility of reverter
is defined as "the undisposed of interest remaining in the grantor, or
in the heirs of the devisor when the owner of land in fee simple
absolute has conveyed or devised it in determinable fee, in fee simple
conditional, or in determinable fee simple conditional."3 In contrast
a reversion is defined as "the remnant of an estate continuing in the
grantor, undisposed of, after the grant of a part of his interest."4
Actually, a "possibility of reversion" fits neither of these definitions
and is at best a confusing misnomer since it does not identify any well-
defined type of future interest.
In concluding that the future interest was alienable regardless of
what it was called, the court relied primarily on Kentucky Revised
Statute 881.210, which provides that rights of reversion may be sold or
conveyed. An earlier Kentucky case and a decision of the United
States Court of Appeals (Sixth Circuit) 5 were cited to support the
interpretation that "any interest or claim to real estate" may be con-
veyed under this statute. The conclusion was drawn that Austin had
at least a "claim" to the school tract when he conveyed to the Calverts.
A careful examination of theie cited cases indicates, however, that in
each one an additional and different statutory section, since revised,6
was relied upon. At the time of the earlier decisions, there was a
statute which provided that "any interest or claim" to real estate was
alienable,7 but this statute is no longer in effect. It is interesting to
note that this statutory provision authorizing the conveyance of any
"claim" in real estate was still in effect in 1921 when the deed in the
instant case was executed, but this significant fact was not mentioned
in the opinion and cannot be relied on as being decisive of the case.
'Young v. C. and 0. B.B. Co., 291 Ky. 262, 163 S.W. 2d 451 (1942); Walker
v. Irvine's Ex'r, 225 Ky. 699, 9 S.W. 2d 1020 (1928).
1 SnnEs, LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS 320 (1936).
'Quoted in Copenhaver v. Pendleton, 155 Va. 462, 155 S.E. 802, 806 (1930).
Nutter v. Russell, 60 Ky. 163 (1860); Kentucky Coal Lands Co. v. Mineral
Development Co., 295 F. 255 (6th.Cir. 1924).
'The prior statute was 2 STANTON'S REv. STAT. c. 80, sec. 6 (1867). It was
revised in 1942. According to NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS TO THE KENTuc-- RE-
visED STATUTES 1372 (1944), this statute is now covered by Ky. BEv. STAT.
882.010.
'Supra note 6.
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Thus, insofar as Kentucky Revised Statute 381.210 is concerned, it
would seem clear that the court should have decided whether the
future interest in question was a possibility of reverter or a reversion,
since the statute on its face authorizes the conveyance of the latter
type interest only.
In considering relevant statutory provisions which are currently
effective, the court apparently overlooked Kentucky Revised Statute
382.010. This section is a revision of the obsolete statute already re-
ferred to and provides that any interest in real property not in the ad-
verse possession of another may be conveyed. This is Kentucky's gen-
eral conveyancing statute and like those in many other states, it makes
the alienability of any future interest turn on whether it is classified
as an interest in land or merely a "claim" or "contingency," as was
contended by the appellants in the Austin case. As to this point, there
is dictum in at least two Kentucky cases8 to the effect that a possi-
bility of reverter is not alienable because it is not a "vested" interest
and is a mere "possibility." On the other hand, the opinion in the
instant case cites a line of Kentucky cases where the court thought
that an interest identical to that involved here was alienable.9 A care-
ful examination of all of these cases leads to the conclusion that the
court, prior to the Austin case, has never categorically decided whether
a possibility of reverter is an interest in land or a mere contingency.
Commissioner Van Sant's dictum in Young v. C. & 0. R.R. Co.10 comes
nearer to a precise answer than that given in any of the other cases
because he does say that a possibility of reverter is not a vested in-
terest but merely a "possibility," as its title suggests. If "vested interest"
is being used in this statement to mean "interest," and "possibility" is
the substantial equivalent of "contingency," then in effect the con-
clusion must be that a possibility of reverter is not an interest in land
within the meaning of Kentucky Revised Statute 382.010.
In attempting to reconcile the confusion in the cases on this point,
one gets the clear feeling that the court's failure to properly. identify
the kind of future interest involved results in a failure to determine
whether the particular future interest is classified as an interest in land.
Such a classification is essential in determining the alienability of the
future interest.
Fayette County Board of Education v. Bryan1" and Jefferson
8 Supra note 2.
'Keeton v. Wayne Co. Board of Education, 287 Ky. 174, 152 S.W. 2d 595
(1941); Phipps v. Frances, 267 Ky. 203, 101 S.W. 2d 924 (1937); King v. Wurts,
227 Ky. 705, 13 S.W. 2d 1043 (1929); Board of Education for Jefferson Co. v.
Littrell, 173 Ky. 78, 190 S.W. 465 (1917).
10291 Ky. 262, 163 S.W. 2d 451 (1942).
"263 Ky. 61, 91 S.W. 2d 990 (1936).
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County Board of Education v. Littrel112 are good examples of the
court's failure to ultimately classify the future interest. In both cases
the court had considerable difficulty distinguishing between a possi-
bility of reverter and a reversion. Although these are two distinctly
different future interests, the court attempted to combine them by
using the expression "possibility of reversion." It will be remembered
that while a reversion is defined as the undisposed of estate remaining
in the grantor after a grant,'8 it can arise only where he has conveyed
away some interest less than a fee. The possibility of reverter arises
only where a determinable fee is created. It is readily apparent that
the distinguishing feature between the two interests is that in the case
of a reversion, the grantor has not parted with all of his estate, while
in the case of a possibility of reverter, the grantor has conveyed all of
his estate in fee, retaining only the right to become the possessory
owner again if the condition on which the fee is made determinable is
breached. If this analysis is followed, it becomes quite clear that a
possibility of reverter is not a reversion, and therefore, a statute (Ken-
tucky Revised Statute 381.210) providing for the alienability of a re-
version should not be construed to permit the alienability of a pos-
sibility of reverter.
Not so apparent is the difference between a possibility of reverter
and a power of termination (the modem term for a right of entry for
condition broken). Apparently, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has
not attempted to differentiate between these two interests. There is
even some evidence in the Austin case that the court has confused
them with one another. For example, to support its reasoning with
respect to the application of the common law rule governing the
alienability of a possibility of reverter, the court cited 33 American
Jurisprudence, section 209, page 691. This section deals with a power
of termination, however, and not with a possibility of reverter. In
other words, a failure to properly determine the kind of interest led
to a failure to determine whether it was an interest in land and left
the question of its alienability unanswered.
A power of termination is defined as "an interest remaining in the
grantor or the heirs of the devisor of land which has been conveyed
or devised on a condition subsequent."14 In comparing this definition
with that of a possibility of reverter, it should be noted that the only
difference is that in one the possessory interest is subject to a condi-
tion subsequent, while in the other, it is subject to a condition
precedent.
' 178 Ky. 78, 190 S.W. 465 (1917).
"Supra note 4.141 Snvms, LAw OF FuTn INT=STs 281 (1936).
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As is often suggested by the authorities, the only practical differ-
ence between these interests is that the possibility of reverter becomes
possessory automatically upon breach of the condition, while the
power of termination becomes possessory only upon re-entry by the
owner of it.15 Although this practical difference may seem to be a
minor one, it becomes all important in deciding whether both types
of future interests are interests in land and therefore alienable. A
right to possession upon breach which becomes possessory auto-
matically may logically be classified as very similar to a reversion which
is universally treated as an alienable interest because it is an interest
in land. On the other hand, a mere right or power to become the
possessory owner, if exercised, seems less like an interest in land.
The courts in a number of other states have, in fact, given this dis-
tinction some effect by holding that (in the absence of an explicit
statute) the power of termination is not alienable, but that the pos-
sibility of reverter is alienable.16 In commenting on this paradoxical
situation, Professor Simes says:
No good reason is perceived why a right of entry for breach of condi-
tion should not be alienable nor why any distinction as to alien-
ability should be drawn between it and the possibility of reverter.1 7
The implication in Professor Simes' argument undoubtedly is that
there is no valid reason why these two kinds of future interests should
not be alienable, except the historical one that they were not con-
sidered interests in land at the common law. Like the contingent re-
mainder, they were conceived to be a mere "hope" or "possibility."
They were classified as more akin to a chose in action than an estate
of ownership. As such, they were subjected to the prohibitions
against assignment of a chose which common law courts conceived
necessary to prevent champerty and maintenance. This historical
classification is reflected in the argument made by appellants in the
instant case to the effect that Austin's interest was a mere contingency.
In view of the wording of Kentucky Revised Statute 382.010, which is
clearly the governing statute, this issue should have been settled by
the court once and for all. In this connection, it is pertinent to point
out that the trend of modern decisions in other states is to classify at
least the possibility of reverter as an interest in land and therefore
alienable.
18
833 Am. Jun. 684 (1941); 77 A.L.R. 344, 345 (1932).
13 Sams, LAw OF FutmE INTEREsTs 159 (1936).
'8 Snmos, LAW OF FurorE INTERESTs 162 (1936).18Kennedy v. Kennedy, 183 Ga. 432, 188 S.E. 722 (1986); Skipper v. Davis,
59 S.W. 2d 454 (Tex. 1932); Collette v. Town of Charlotte, 114 Vt. 357, 45 A. 2d
203 (1940).
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In summary, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals should not
lose another good opportunity to clarify the Kentucky view as to the
alienability of both the possibility of reverter and the power of term-
ination, and to do what was not done in the Austin case: explain
precisely why such future interests are or are not alienable.
GAWmNm L. Tummi
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-MUNICIPAL
OCCUPATIONAL PRIVILEGE TAXES-PHOTOGRAPHERS
Occupational privilege taxes by municipalities, involved in suits
concerning the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, have
traditionally been categorized into two classes-peddlers' taxes, and
solicitors' taxes. Generally speaking, such taxes on peddlers have been
ruled constitutionally valid, while similar taxes or regulations on
solicitors have been held to violate the Commerce Clause.1 This note
presents a problem of taxation and regulation in an area which is
thought to be between the two categories. Especially noted herein
will be the current attempts, failures, and successes of municipal
privilege taxes on photographers. In general, it can be stated that the
problem settles to a conflict between the police power and the taxing
power of the states,2 and the power of the Federal government to
regulate commerce.
"'The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States .... ;
'The contended need for taxation and regulation of either the peddlers or
the solicitors is based upon several complaints-they create outside competition;
they are pestiferous nuisances; they may be dishonest; they are ofttimes financially
irresponsible; their trades present many and varied opportunities for fraud and
crimes collateral to their admittance into private homes; and local government is
unable to collect from these classes revenues under the usual general tax laws.
See HARTMAN, STATE TAxATiON OF INTERSTATE COM2vECE 111 (1953); 40 Am.
Jun. 921 (1942). The tax power and the reserved police ower of the states-to
further the public health, morals, and sifety; to prevent gaud, deceit, and dis-
honest dealing generally-are bases for imposing some regulation and taxation
where the laws are reasonably designed to accomplish these objects. See Breard
v. Alexandria, 841 U.S. 622, 640 (1951); State v. Mobley, 234 N.C. 55, 66 S.E.
2d 12, 19 (1951). Allied with the police power basis and the tax power basis
for such taxation is the belief that the interstate commerce and interstate business
must bear its fair share of the cost of the production and benefits it receives from
the local areas. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 49 (1940); 4
ARx. L. BEv. 473, 474 (1950).
In opposition to such arguments put forth by states and cities is the Con-
stitutional protection agaist erection of trade barriers guaranteed by the Com-
merce Clause. Certainly the Clause definitely rules out the contended need to
protect local merchants from outside competition, and it can be stated generally
that the taxation or regulation by the local governments will be upheld only where
it is not discriminatory against interstate commerce, or where it does not unduly
burden or prohibit the free flow on interstate commerce. Cordell v. Common-
wealth, 254 S.W. 2d 484, 485 (Ky. 1953).
